For any stakeholders in the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the latest seven-hour speech delivered by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea top leader Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang on Tuesday contains signals that no side can afford to ignore.

After enduring sanctions for more than a decade, this is arguably the first time that the DPRK’s top leader has acknowledged their effect, saying that the country “urgently needs an external environment favorable for economic construction”.

The warnings Kim has issued this time — for example, to own new strategic weapons — should only be heard against this backdrop.

Although no parties should doubt its ability to deliver them, it should be understood that rather than fresh menace from Pyongyang, this stems not from its desire for new additions to its arsenal but from its desire to raise awareness of its pressing economic needs.

As Kim has vowed to divert attention to economic construction and make it a central task after wrapping up four visits to China in 10 months last year, were it not for some life-threatening difficulties caused by sanctions upon its national economic development, he would never have risked the world’s condemnation, not to mention the possibility of providing the US with a new excuse to step up the sanctions.

With tens of big and small joint militarily drills being staged, which the US leader has promised to stop, the US’ inaction in effect means that Washington is intent on continuously exerting external pressure on the DPRK’s security while seeking to create internal tensions within the DPRK due to a faltering economy.

So after the US simply chose to ignore the year-end deadline Pyongyang had set for the restarting of their denuclearization negotiations, the DPRK has finally realized that the US is not going to hold true to its commitments.

The world should need no further evidence to realize that Pyongyang’s “preemptive and crucial measures” to stop nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests, and dismantle its nuclear testing grounds have been exploited for three media-circus meetings, rather than any substantial actions by the US.

The realization that the US is not talking in good faith has spurred Pyongyang to make the difficult decision to resort to the self-inflicting arms building route again, which is actually contradictory to its economy-centered strategy.

Although the door for dialogue has not been closed, by declaring that the “scope and depth of bolstering our deterrent will be properly coordinated depending on the US’ future attitude”, Kim means that Pyongyang might only be willing to discuss arms control for the time being, rather than denuclearization, a worrying step backward for the denuclearization endeavors.
This should be regarded as the US reaping what it has sown.