Despite both governments' historical preference to put their disputes over the nondemarcated border between China and India on the back burner, the reality on the ground along the Line of Actual Control has led to suggestions that the consensus is in danger of fraying. And evidence appears to be accumulating with each passing day to support such a view.

Tensions in the border areas show no sign of abating, even as negotiations between the two militaries drag on.

Amid the clamor about the upcoming Malabar naval exercise, which convenes the naval forces of Australia, India, Japan and the United States, and which the participants have made no bones about being targeted at China, the US secretaries of defense and state are reportedly to visit India next week to strengthen an "alliance" against China.

For all the reticence New Delhi's decision-makers have demonstrated in public, changes in the official attitude toward China are clear and beyond doubt. There was even a report that "more and more people within the Indian government" support "officially launching negotiations with Taiwan on a free trade agreement", even though they know that the island is an inalienable part of China.

Although it remains to be seen how far New Delhi will depart from its historical non-aligned foreign policy, it obviously perceives there are benefits to be gained from the US' Indo-Pacific strategy.

India is a critical piece on Washington's geopolitical chessboard. Just as US Defense Secretary Mark Esper said, Washington sees India as "the most consequential partner" for the US in the Indo-Pacific.

It is India's business whether it sticks to its nonaligned policy or not, and what alliances it chooses to form. But when it comes to the alliance the US seeks with India, China will naturally sit up and take notice. Unlike other regional partnerships focused on development initiatives, Washington makes no secret about its intentions of "an alliance" with New Delhi－to counter alleged Chinese influence.

Foreign policy hawks in Washington want New Delhi to be their key proxy in confronting China on its doorstep. Some hawkish politicians in New Delhi seek Washington's support in their tug-of-war with Beijing.

New Delhi may choose to adopt a new strategic posture. But there is a pitfall awaiting should it actually assume the role Washington is assigning it. If it joins Washington's strategic siege of China, or makes trouble over Taiwan, it will change the nature of bilateral interaction and set the already troubled relations on a collision course, which will prove costly for both parties.