After Washington revealed its strategy to ensure secure and reliable supplies of critical minerals in June 2019, the Republic of Korea followed suit with its own critical mineral strategy in 2023, focusing on its "dependencies" on Chinese imports.

The strategy identified 10 minerals as critical, including lithium and nickel, which have been placed under special regulation, with the strategy aiming to reduce the ROK's reliance on Chinese supplies of the minerals by 50 percent before 2030.

With ROK enterprises stepping up their efforts to diversify their suppliers, a Yonhap News Agency report on Wednesday predicts that "decoupling" from China on critical minerals will become "even more conspicuous" as the year progresses.

According to the report, imports from China of key minerals needed for manufacturing electric vehicles in the ROK dropped for the first time in years in 2023 — lithium hydroxide from 87.9 percent to 79.6 percent year-on-year and neodymium magnets from 87.5 percent to 84.7 percent.

While diversifying and de-risking crucial supply chains may be reasonable to avoid overdependence on a single supplier in the event that supplier becomes unreliable for whatever reason, that is not what the ROK and the US are doing.

As the Yonhap report states, the decline in imports of the minerals from China is due to intensive government efforts to "de-sinicize" the ROK economy. With both the government and businesses striving to diversify supply chains, "specific accomplishments" will begin to emerge this year, according to the report.

This seems a matter of course correction under the present circumstances as the US is pushing its allies and partners to force China out of their supply chains as it tries to impede China's development. Despite benefitting from China's development and the strong economic cooperation forged since China launched its reform and opening-up more than 40 years ago, Seoul has been prompted to do Washington's bidding as the current government wants to strengthen the ROK's security ties with the US, as it considers the efforts of its predecessor to achieve a rapprochement with Pyongyang to have been a failure. It wants to take a tougher line toward the ROK's northern neighbor. Washington, on its part, views the ROK as a key part of both its strategy in Northeast Asia and its "Indo-Pacific" strategy.

The acceleration of the ROK's critical mineral strategy comes after it received Washington's assurance about it being covered by the US' "extended nuclear deterrence". It is Seoul's inability to forge cordial relations with Pyongyang that has created its real dependency, which is on the illusory comfort of the US' security umbrella. The upshot of this is a vicious circle in which the ROK's dependency on the US further alienates the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, leading to a worsening security environment that pushes Seoul further into Washington's embrace.

That is why despite the risk of ruining its long friendly and tremendously profitable relations with China, the ROK is by and large doing Washington's bidding.

A key government-sponsored think tank in the ROK published a proposal for building stable supply chains of core minerals on March 6. According to this, to stabilize supplies of key minerals, the ROK should first formulate a relationship of mutual trust with China, which the think tank believes will assume a dominant position in the global market, and make the country's China policy accordingly. As multiple industry sources in the ROK have indicated, in spite of ROK enterprises having increased imports from countries such as Chile and Australia, the ROK's dependence on Chinese imports remains high.

Seoul should reconsider its approach, as it will be paying unnecessary costs for its ill-considered dependency on the US.