Israel's Security Cabinet reached a consensus on Oct 15 on how to thwart Iran's Oct 1-style missile attacks. After reportedly holding talks with the US' Joe Biden administration, Israel has largely ruled out attacking Iran's nuclear and oil facilities, choosing instead to focus solely on military targets. The decision is intended to prevent the further destabilization of the Middle East, avoid jeopardizing the US presidential election on Nov 5 or the ongoing presidential campaign, or ruining the chances of Israel normalizing relations with the Gulf Arab states.

The Washington Post, citing US officials, reported on Oct 14 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has given formal assurances to Washington that it may launch a "limited" retaliatory attack on Iran. But the report also said that the "sword of Damocles" (of Israel's retaliation) could fall before the US election, meaning the outcome is likely to be known in the next couple of weeks.

In response, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries issued a monthly report on Monday, lowering its global oil demand expectations for the fourth quarter of the year and for 2025.This suggests a panic-driven surge in oil prices, fueled by the fear of a major potential conflict between Israel and Iran, may subside.

Given Israel's strategic practices and the Middle East's geopolitical landscape, Israel would have launched a massive attack on Iran, but the fact that it has not yet prepared militarily and diplomatically, especially due to the constraints imposed on it by the US and Gulf Arab states, has prompted Tel Aviv to shelve its retaliation plan — perhaps for now. Iran fired about 200 missiles at Israel in response to Israel's bombing of Hezbollah's headquarters in Lebanon, which killed the outfit's leader Hassan Nasrallah, senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard commander Abbas Nilforoushan and other Hezbollah activists.

Despite the Iranian attacks being condemned by the West, the US in particular, and Israel claiming to have intercepted all the Iranian missiles, some of them hit Israeli military and intelligence facilities, demonstrating Iran's long-range strike capability and exposing the loopholes in Israel's air defense system.

Netanyahu has said that Iran will be made to pay for the attacks. Since its founding, Israel has had a deterrence-centered defense strategy, characterized by overpowering military capability, violation of international law, and disproportionate punishment for any armed challenge. Yet Israel has not retaliated against Iran even more than two weeks after the attacks, because of several reasons.

First, since Israel, as it proudly claims, is fighting on "seven fronts", it has to consider the consequences of escalating the conflict with Iran. For more than one year, Israel has been battering the Gaza Strip and making incursions into the West Bank, tackling Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi rebels in Yemen and Shia militias in Iraq and continuing its airstrikes on Syria, all the while continuing its confrontation with Iran.

Second, Israel's military focus has shifted from operations in Gaza in the south to Lebanon in the north, leaving it incapable of launching a cross-border strike eastward against a more formidable and resilient Iran because, despite all the hype, Israel is a small country with limited strategic maneuvering space, and lack of conventional military power.

Based on its knowledge of wars in the Middle East, Israel has worked out a strategy of tackling threats one at a time while striving to attain air superiority, and using its forces to neutralize the most immediate dangers.

However, Israel cannot replicate its past military successes against neighboring countries such as Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan when facing a much larger and stronger Iran. If a counterstrike proves ineffective or provokes a fresh round of Iranian missile attacks, the loopholes in Israel's decades-long strategic deterrence mechanism will be fully exposed, shattering its reputation of being "invincible".

Third, internal divisions in Israel are growing, leading to political failures despite some military victories. Israel's Security Cabinet remains divided on whether to expand the conflict, with increasing focus on the differences between Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, which have turned into a competition for controlling the Likud Party in the future.

Israel's focus on boosting its development has shifted to managing conflicts, which have deteriorated the investment and living environment, with large-scale withdrawal of foreign capital, companies and expatriates from the country. The trend of elite talents leaving the country has intensified, with an increasing number of Israeli citizens considering migrating to other countries.

Fourth, the US-Israel relationship is a key factor behind Israel not retaliating against Iran. Although it considers Israel's security its top priority in the Middle East, Washington has shifted its strategic focus away from the region to Europe and the "Indo-Pacific" region to the extent of taking measures to prevent the conflict from spreading to the Persian Gulf which would drag the US into direct confrontation with Iran.

As the US presidential election approaches, the Biden administration, concerned about the impact of the conflict on the Democratic Party's votes, appears unhappy with the aggressive Israeli government, with complaints against Netanyahu becoming almost public. Washington strongly opposes Israeli strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities, fearing it could result in a nuclear leak or cause Tehran to withdraw from the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It also advises Israel to avoid targeting Iran's oil facilities to prevent triggering a new global energy crisis.

And fifth, Gulf Arab states' opposition to Israel escalating the conflict has forced Israel to shelve its plans to launch a major attack on Iran. The Israel-Palestine conflict has changed the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East, with traditional Arab-led opposition to Israel giving way to a confrontation between Israel and the Iran-led "Axis of Resistance".

The six Arab countries that have normalized relations with Israel now want to continue dialogue and reconciliation with Iran, while focusing on their own development and praying for peace in the Middle East. These countries recently said they will not open their airspace to Israel nor will they allow US military bases on their soil to help Israel launch air strikes on Iran.

If Israel proceeds to launch a retaliatory attack on Iran, the trilateral security framework among the US, Israel and the Arab states, often described as the "Middle East minilateral" or "Middle East NATO", could collapse, undoing years of diplomatic hard work. In fact, Iran has conveyed through Saudi Arabia that it will not retaliate further if Israel's response is not treacherous.

These developments have helped ease Israel's anxiety, which means that despite the stick of Israel's retaliatory attack raised high, it may only fall symbolically.

The author is the dean of and a professor at the Institute for Studies on the Mediterranean Rim at Zhejiang International Studies University.

The views don't necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

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