The People's Liberation Army's "Justice Mission 2025" exercises around the Taiwan Island did not occur in a vacuum.

They arrived soon after the announcement of the largest US arms sales to Taiwan in history, and against the backdrop of Washington's recently released National Security Strategy, which once again elevates the "first island chain" to a position of central strategic importance.

Read together, these developments clarify the intent behind the PLA's actions: to demonstrate both the willingness and the capacity to defend China's national sovereignty, while signaling that the conceptual framework underpinning United States regional strategy has become increasingly obsolete.

The "first island chain" is a Cold War artefact — an inherited dogma that assumes maritime chokepoints and forward-deployed allies can indefinitely constrain China's strategic space. Justice Mission 2025, like the exercises preceding it, directly contests this assumption. By showing how quickly and comprehensively the PLA Navy and Air Force can establish a cordon around the Taiwan Island, Beijing is not merely rehearsing military contingencies. It is underscoring that strategic realities have shifted, and that older doctrines no longer map onto contemporary balances of power.

This message should not have come as a surprise. Former US national security advisor Jake Sullivan recently acknowledged that Nancy Pelosi's 2022 visit to Taipei was counterproductive. At the time, the Biden White House reportedly advised against the visit, yet Pelosi proceeded regardless. Within days of her departure, the PLA responded with exercises that demonstrated its capacity to surround and effectively secure the island within 24 hours. The signal was unambiguous. Yet, as Justice Mission suggests, sometimes the same message must be repeated before it is fully understood.

Importantly, Justice Mission is not an isolated event. It is the fourth major exercise since 2022 to demonstrate the PLA's ability to rapidly establish control over the maritime and airspace environment around the Taiwan Island. The repetition itself is instructive. This is not escalation for its own sake, but reinforcement of a strategic fact: the mainland's capacity to determine outcomes in the Strait has reached a level of maturity and reliability that leaves little room for miscalculation.

At the same time, the Taiwan Island's internal political landscape is becoming increasingly fluid. The new chairwoman of the Chinese Kuomingtang party (KMT), Cheng Li-wun, has condemned actions directed towards "independence" and has sought to revive the 1992 Consensus as a pragmatic pathway toward cross-Strait peace and prosperity.

In contrast, current Taiwan leader Lai Ching-te faces impeachment proceedings amid declining public support. Earlier attempts by the Democratic Progressive Party to recall KMT legislators were decisively rejected, further underscoring a public desire for stability rather than confrontation. Lai's subsequent efforts to court support in Washington — via the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and alignment with Israel — only highlight the narrowing of his political options.

Ironically, Washington's dramatic show of support through unprecedented arms sales came just days before Justice Mission 2025 was announced, reinforcing the likelihood that such gestures would backfire. Arms sales may benefit the US military-industrial complex, but they do little to alter the underlying strategic equation.

The takeaway message is increasingly clear: cross-Strait dynamics have changed. The United States is neither well-positioned nor genuinely inclined to prevent China from securing the island — quite possibly without a shot being fired. And crucially, politics on the Taiwan Island is beginning to internalize this reality.

The author is an adjunct professor at Queensland University of Technology in Australia and was previously policy adviser to former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.