At a news conference during this year’s two sessions, a foreign journalist asked a question with that familiar accusatory undertone: China’s trade surplus is too large — is it becoming the “powder keg” of global trade friction?

Western media outlets attempt to pin the “surplus dumper” label on China year after year. But this year, Commerce Minister Wang Wentao offered a response that cut through their noise. “Exports and imports are like the two wheels of a vehicle,” he said. “The more balanced these two wheels are, the smoother and farther the vehicle travels.”

Yet those fixated on surplus figures seem determined to look at only one wheel while ignoring the other. China is not only the world’s largest exporter — it is also the world’s second-largest importer. Customs data show that in 2025, China’s imports reached 18.5 trillion yuan ($2.68 trillion), maintaining the country’s position as the second-largest import market for 17 consecutive years.

Also, foreign media rarely mention that it is not that China doesn’t want to buy more, it is that some countries won’t sell. Wang Jun, vice-minister of the General Administration of Customs, put it bluntly: “It needs to be pointed out that some countries politicize economic and trade issues, restricting high-tech product exports to China on various pretexts. Otherwise, China would import even more.”

China’s trade surplus is fundamentally a reflection of efficient global supply chain coordination, not China “taking advantage” of anyone. Chinese exports contain substantial inputs — components, raw materials, technology — from around the world. Foreign-invested enterprises account for nearly one-third of China’s foreign trade. Behind every product stamped “Made in China” may lie European design, United States or Republic of Korea chips, and Australian or Brazilian raw materials.

Therefore, the “huge surplus” represents the collective output of global production factors optimally configured in China: the profits are shared among nations, they are not merely numbers on China’s ledger.

Historically, the United Kingdom, the US and Germany all ran substantial surpluses during their industrial peaks. Back then, Western media hailed these as symbols of “efficiency” and “competitiveness”. The anxiety among some Western media outlets now isn’t really about the surplus itself, but the discomfort with China’s rising competitiveness and their reluctance to accept a multipolar world.

China has never made pursuing a surplus its development goal, nor will it close the door to opening-up because of external noise. This year’s Government Work Report states clearly: China will “actively expand imports and promote balanced trade development”.

This isn’t empty talk. The 2026 tariff adjustment plan granted provisional import tariff rates to 935 products spanning healthcare, consumer goods, and other areas close to people’s lives. Lower tariffs mean more affordable imports for consumers and more sales for foreign exporters.

Moreover, late last year, the Ministry of Commerce launched a major initiative titled “Big Market for All: Export to China”, which features over 100 promotional events to facilitate the entry of high-quality global goods and services into the Chinese market.

The Government Work Report also contains two key phrases: “ensure national treatment for foreign-funded enterprises” and “enhance services and support for them”.

This means that for foreign enterprises coming to China — setting up factories, hiring people, going through procedures — the process will be no different from what it is for domestic enterprises.

The train of China’s development is picking up speed. Behind it is the pursuit of a better life by 1.4 billion people, and an ever-expanding market of demand. The carriage doors are open wide and all are welcome aboard.