The three decade-long trial reforms have helped China extract some precious experiences, and more important, enabled it to detect some institutional obstacles that hinder the further deepening of the reform and opening-up initiative. All these tell that China needs to have a new top-end institutional arrangement to absorb all its valuable experience and lessons it has learned from the previous reform process.

Due to different priorities in different fields, China's reforms over the past decades have shown an obvious characteristic of fragmentation. Compared with full-fledged reforms in the economic area, social reforms have made much slower progress. The country has yet to build a public governance framework with benign interactions between the government, the market and the society. Besides, the country's reforms in certain areas prove to be mainly a response to some emergency problems that lack systematic and long-term strategic considerations, as indicated by ones in the educational, healthcare and other sectors related with people's livelihood.

Without an overall and far-sighted top-end institutional arrangement, any reforms in a single field will be difficult to be advanced. In the absence of an effective oversight mechanism from such a top-end institutional design, some local governments will also likely pursue selfish interests or compromise the interests of ordinary people in the name of reforms.

The stress on the importance of the top-end institutional design does not mean underestimating the value of "crossing the river by feeling the stones". Despite its paramount importance, the top-end systematic design still needs some changes and corrections in the process of its implementation for self-improvements. That means any well-conceived top-end institutional design should leave certain space to local governments for innovation.

China is a large country with huge differences among different regions and industries. This decides that any systematic arrangement from the central government should allow varying implementation mechanisms among different regions. At the same time, any scientific top-end institutional design, which can only set up a basic institutional framework, cannot formulate specific measures for implementation.

To raise its political efficiency, any big country like China should not only strengthen its top-end design and work out systematic arrangements suitable for its concrete national conditions, but also delegate some power to local governments and encourage their innovations.

In a diversified society, a top-end institutional arrangement is badly needed to balance the interests among various parties. However, the general nature of any top-end design decides its limitations in resolving specific conflicts of interest among different parties, which demand local governments should be given certain space to play their role in its implementation.

Both the top-end institutional design and "crossing the river by feeling the stones" will be of particular importance to China's new round of reforms. Without biding farewell to the current fragmentized reforms, any overall reforms, even well-conceived, will be difficult to press ahead with. Similarly, without "crossing the river by feeling the stones", any top-end institutional design will be difficult to effectively implement.

The Chinese version of this article first appeared in the Study Times.