But how to transform a planned economy to a market economy remains a challenge.

Deng visited Shenzhen in 1984 to see if market reform was working. Deng was happy with, if not surprised at, what he saw. The market-based reform in Shenzhen easily spread nationwide with the support of the central government, and 14 other coastal cities were chosen as opening-up locations the next year.

PBOC clarifies rules on FTZ yuan business

Shanghai zone in search of identity

The environment for reformers today is completely different. Reform is no longer a national consensus, but a balance of interests among different groups.

Today, the river is too deep to wade across. Some just become so addicted to fondling the stones, they don't cross the river, critics joke.

Premier Li Keqiang said two years ago the government should not stop making the cake larger, but the cake must be cut fairly. He hinted the government wouldn't look into how people got larger slices of cake before, but the lucky ones would have to adjust their expectations.

Yet, the attitude of compromise with vested interests hasn't made reform any easier in the past two years. He angrily pounded the table in Beijing last week, as China Business News reported, and vowed to invite third-party watchdogs to supervise and evaluate local governments' reform efforts.

Generally speaking, the resistance Shanghai officials meet in financial reform comes from SOEs and banks that benefit from their dominance of financial resources and markets, as well as corrupt officials.

Today's reformers can't just invite foreign investment.

Given China's huge economy and complaints about unfairness and pollution, reformers must be vigilant to the risks associated with yuan liberalization and market-based interest rates.

Xi's vigilance against the risks of financial reform is justifiable. But he needs to help Shanghai coordinate interests and actions of different ministries directly under his leadership. Or, the experimental field will be just a showcase.