New US-Russian nuke treaty so near yet so far
The US and the erstwhile Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in July 1991, which stipulated that they had to reduce their offensive strategic weapons by 30 percent in seven years. The treaty said neither side could possess more than 1,600 delivery systems and 6,000 nuclear warheads.
This important cornerstone of US-Russian (previously Soviet) strategic weapons talks, expired last month. Though the two countries have not yet signed a new treaty, they have promised to follow the principles of START and negotiate a new one. Washington and Moscow both attribute the delay to disagreements over "technical" issues.
One of the most crucial issues in the proposed new treaty is the precise number of delivery systems and warheads to be reduced. In July last year, the US and Russia agreed to a preliminary range of capping: each side keeping 500 to 1,000 delivery systems and 1,500 to 1,675 warheads. Now the bigger stumbling block is not warheads, but the delivery systems. Russia is estimated to have an operational deployment of 620 delivery systems and 2,787 warheads, and the US, 1,176 and fewer than 2,200. Since both countries want to maintain their respective advantage and restrain the other, Russia has been arguing for more cuts in the delivery systems, while the US insists on more delivery systems and fewer warheads.
The US once had its on-site inspection spot at Russia's missile factory in Votkinsk, where the "Topol" intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and the "Brava" sea-based missiles were assembled. And Russia had its spot at America's Hercules missile assembly factory in Magna, Utah. Since no new missiles were being developed at the Hercules factory, Russia withdrew the spot in 2001. Moscow argued that such measures were unnecessary because the US and Russia were no longer antagonistic toward each other and inspections had become unilateral for Russia. After hard bargaining, the US withdrew its inspectors from the Russian factory last month.
The US now plans to load conventional warheads on its ICBMs in order to boost its "prompt global strike" capability, saying a new treaty should not limit ICBMs carrying conventional warheads. Russia contends that the ICBMs could be reloaded with nuclear warheads, and hence should be included in the total number of delivery systems. But the US is not likely to make concessions on this front because the project was finalized during the George W. Bush administration and could reach combat capability in five years. A possible compromise would be for Washington to meet Moscow's demand of raising the ceiling on the delivery systems and excluding America's ICBMs with conventional warheads from the proposed limit.
Another heatedly debated topic is the missile defense system (MDS). America's MDS will break the balance of strategic arms and increase its military advantage over Russia. In response, Russia could develop new strategic delivery systems, and link nuclear arms control to the MDS.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin have stressed many a time the significance of the issue for the strategic arms talks with the US, and asked it not to extend its MDS deployment beyond the existing level. The US argues that a new treaty should deal only with the strategic offensive arms, and MDS should be discussed through another channel.
In fact, US President Barack Obama has been assailed at home for scrapping the plan to deploy MDS in Central and Eastern Europe. The US Congress and Pentagon are not likely to accept any further substantial restraint on the MDS.
The delay in reaching a new treaty highlights the rough side of US-Russian ties. Washington and Moscow both insist that they are no longer enemies and that the reduction of strategic weapons is mutually beneficial. When bargaining over the details, however, they inevitably disagree on how to maintain strategic balance and keep the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence on their side.
One of the reasons why Washington is eager to have a treaty with Moscow is that it wants to avoid unilateral reduction. Russia, on the other hand, cares more about the balance of strategic capability, and argues that nuclear arms reduction must consider elements such as outer-space weapons, MDS and conventional forces. This shows it is still vigilant against the US. The small number of reduction agreed to by the two nuclear giants indicates that they have not yet rid themselves of the traditional mindset of assured mutual destruction.
Since Russia has recovered from the ebb of 1991, the Medvedev-Putin government is not ready to make infinite concessions. Instead, it is seeking equal status with the US at the negotiations table. During the Cold War era, NATO relied on nuclear weapons to offset the Soviet Union's advantage in conventional forces. The situation has now reversed: Russia is dependent on nuclear arms to guarantee its security.
Obama's vision of a nuclear-free world is appealing, but it is still not a universally accepted idea. And though Medvedev agrees to Obama's concept of a nuclear-free world, Russia does not trust the US totally; it even suspects America to have hidden agenda. If Medvedev and Putin do not respond positively to Obama, his vision would remain only a vision.
In a word, though the US and Russia claim a new treaty has been delayed because of "technical" reasons, the fact is more than technical issues are to blame. It reflects the fierce competition and mutual distrust between the two nuclear giants. And unless the two overcome them, a new treaty will remain elusive.
The author is director of the Center for Arms Control and International Security Studies, China Institute of International Studies.
(China Daily 01/28/2010 page9)
