Recent developments in the Asia-Pacific region have cast a shadow over the first round of China-Japan-ROK Free Trade Agreement talks, to be held in Seoul from March 26 to 28.

Sino-Japanese relations show no signs of improvement because of the Diaoyu Islands dispute. The two countries' mutual suspicion has been influencing many of their decisions. There seems to be a "strategic competition" between China and Japan. On the surface, the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands may look like a conflict for the sake of "face". But in reality, it reflects the structural contradictions in Sino-Japanese relations. Japan cannot accept a rising and more "assertive" China, whereas China find suspicious Japan's intention to transform itself into a "normal" country.

If China is strengthening its military, Japan is beefing up its defense forces, and both have issued hard-hitting statements against each other. Japan and China are caught in a strategic race of resolve and patience, and the resultant erosion in mutual trust between Chinese and Japanese peoples and rising nationalist feelings are making it difficult for the two sides to reach a compromise.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership, aggressively promoted by the United States, too, has affected the prospects of a triangular cooperation among China, Japan and the Republic of Korea by giving rise to centrifugal forces. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has formally announced that Japan will join the TPP free-trade talks despite strong opposition from Japanese lobby groups and lawmakers from rural constituencies.

After Abe's visit to the US in February, Japan declared that joining the TPP was in line with the country's interests. And for the first time, the US agreed to hold talks with Japan over Tokyo's exceptions to total free trade. Japan is set to join the TPP once it is satisfied with the "bonus" it would get from the arrangement.

This will further strengthen the US-Japan alliance, both on the economic and defense fronts, and help them seize the initiative in forming the rules of trade system in the Asia-Pacific region.

The US has also invited the ROK to join the TPP negotiations. Since the TPP is a strategic US agenda, the ROK, as its ally, has to support it even though it might not be paying too much attention to it now. Seoul favors an alliance with Washington also because of the grim security situation on the Korean Peninsula. Besides, trade ties between Washington and Seoul were strengthened last year with the US-ROK Free Trade Agreement.

These developments are bad news for China-Japan-ROK cooperation, which at best is sluggish.

Delivering a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington in February, Abe, a hawkish nationalist, declared: "Japan is back." Combined with Japan's recent actions, it is apparent that Japan is busy implementing its own "strategic rebalancing" act.

There are several reasons for that. First, as a trusted ally, Japan has to work with the US in devising its grand strategy.

Second, by joining the TPP talks, Japan will not only have more bargaining chips in the China-Japan-ROK cooperation mechanism, but can also force the US to grant it greater concessions in TPP discussions. Overall, it seems Japan enjoys a relatively favorable position in the regional cooperation process.

Third, driven by domestic political factors, Abe is trying to build an image of a strong leader by exploiting the regional cooperation platform.

There is thus little doubt that Japan will be the biggest variable factor in China-Japan-ROK cooperation, and its willingness will largely determine the future of trilateral cooperation.

Beijing faces a difficult choice. Should it accept major compromises in exchange for continuous China-Japan-ROK cooperation? Or, should it stick to its established principles?

If the problem between China and Japan had been only of "face", the Diaoyu Islands dispute would not have been difficult to resolve. But since it concerns strategic interests, one party cannot make huge concessions just to ensure a smooth, continuous triangular cooperation. And one thing that should avoid the most is hasty decision.

Moreover, China needs not employ too many strategic resources against the US and Japan, because there are many rising powers in its neighborhood and other parts of the world, such as the ROK, Indonesia, India, Brazil, South Africa and, of course, Russia, with which it can develop its trade and other relations.

Beijing need to think how best it can use its strategic resources, especially when it is forming its own grand strategic thinking and diplomacy to get out of the mire that regional cooperation has become.

The author is a research scholar at the Center for Regional Security Studies, affiliated to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

(China Daily 03/26/2013 page9)