Second, Tsai claims to support the "status quo". For eight years, the 1992 Consensus has served as the foundation for cross-Straits relations. This means Taiwan's present policy toward relations with the mainland is the status quo and rejecting the 1992 Consensus upends the status quo.

Third, Tsai promises to handle relations with the mainland in accordance with "the will of the Taiwan people", which means she can easily endorse the 1992 Consensus. Serious public opinion polls-not the "nonsense polls" so often cited by Taiwan politicians and partisan think tanks-reveal that most of the residents in Taiwan support the present approach to relations with the mainland. A 2015 security survey conducted jointly by Chengchi University and Duke University shows that a solid majority of Taiwan residents either "support" or "strongly support" this approach to cross-Straits relations.

Fourth, top DPP officials concede that their party's victories in 2015 and 2016 could be traced to Taiwan's economic problems-not the island's approach to cross-Straits relations. In fact, the security survey shows that a plurality of Taiwan residents support increased economic exchanges with the mainland. And less than 1 percent (0.4 percent to be precise) believes that economic conditions will improve if cross-Straits relations worsen. So a failure to endorse the 1992 Consensus will likely undermine cross-Straits relations, harm the Taiwan economy and reduce the DPP's prospects in future elections.

And fifth, the global community will welcome an endorsement of the 1992 Consensus. No one wants to see a return of "Taiwan the Troublemaker". In keeping with its longstanding policy, the US will not "officially" endorse the 1992 Consensus. But the US has never voiced opposition to it.

On May 21, 2015, Susan Thornton, US assistant secretary of state, appeared to establish a linkage between the US policy and Taiwan's approach to the mainland. She said Washington hopes to continue to cooperate with Taiwan "and it must be said that an important ingredient of that close cooperation in recent years has been the stable management of cross-Straits ties. We have an abiding interest in the preservation of cross-Straits stability, and this interest informs our overall approach to cross-Straits issues." If that statement wasn't clear enough, media outlets reported that Washington sent a former high-ranking official to Taiwan in March to "unofficially" tell Tsai that the US wants her to accept the 1992 Consensus.

In sum, the time for election year politics has passed. Tsai's speech on May 20 will provide her with a historic opportunity to honor her election year promises. And endorsing the 1992 Consensus will show that she intends to maintain the status quo, respect majority opinion, reassure the international community and get Taiwan's economy moving again.

The author is distinguished professor and director of the Graduate Program in Global Studies at Missouri State University, US.