However, these statements can hardly dispel people's questions and concerns. The countries that are prohibited from importing arms from Japan are small in number. That is to say in the name of contributing to international cooperation and its security interests, Japan can theoretically sell weapons to the vast majority of countries in the world.

Earlier, Abe began pushing for what he calls "active pacifism" in a bid to further get involved in international security affairs and enhance Japan's international status and influence, renewing arms exports can serve as stepping stone in pushing forward this strategy. Japan has also sought to modify the outline of its Official Development Assistance and hook the ODA directly to defense equipment exports. All these actions have added great uncertainty to the international security situation, and the world should be on the alert.

China, as a close neighbor of Japan and a victim of Japan's past aggression, has every reason to be concerned about Japan renewing its arms exports, especially as they might abet regional disputes. The new principles will enable Japan to sell defense equipment with the purpose of improving the defense capabilities of Southeast Asian countries, which is indicated in the Japanese National Security Strategy.

Seeing that some Southeast Asian counties have maritime territorial disputes with China, Japan intends to make the most of these contradictions and narrow the gap between these countries and their powerful neighbor in military strength through arms exports in a bid to counterbalance China. Japan's move is undoubtedly further strangling China-Japan relations.

Moreover, the new principles and guidelines on arms exports will have a great influence on the formation of international joint development and the production of defense equipment. Japan is already in the lead in researching and developing many conventional weapons, and if it can work together with the United States and European countries that own advanced science and technology and powerful military industries, it will put more pressure on neighboring countries' security assurance and defense equipment level. Meanwhile, Japan is still using every means to hinder European and other countries' arms exports to China and their and defense cooperation with it.

At present, Japan's relations with its close neighbors, including China, Russia, the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, all have rifts to a greater or lesser extent. In this situation, Japan's move to ease arms exports will inevitably disrupt the regional military balance and security order, directly forcing neighboring countries to increase their defense investment, resulting in an arms race and security dilemma in the region.

At the end of 2011, the Yoshihiko Noda cabinet approved a plan to ease the Three Principles on Arms Exports that excluded Japan's allies and friendly countries from the ban contained in the three principles. Since then, Japan has gradually begun to engage in joint development of defense equipment with Vietnam, the Philippines, Britain, France, Australia, India, Turkey and other countries. People have reason to wonder about the future of Japan's arms exports. Japan has been speeding up the "normalization of national defense" in pursuit of military power. With the eased principles and guidelines for weapons exports, it will go further off track on the road of exports and the joint development of arms.

Shinzo Abe is using arms exports as important means to revive Japan as a powerful country. By lifting the ban on arms exports, promoting a qualitative change in Japan's security policy and basic national policy and pushing Japan forward as a "normal military power", the conservative political groups led by Abe are trying to reverse the trend of the times. However, they will finally be hoisted by their own petard. We hope that what Abe has done and would do will not strike up a prelude to the collapse of Japan's "peace building" established for decades after WWII.

The author is a researcher and director of the Political Research Center of the Institute of Japanese Studies, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.