Judged solely from the "desired end-state" the United States Defense Department portrayed in its just updated Arctic Strategy, there is nothing wrong with that policy blueprint.

After all, as an Arctic nation, the US has every reason to want the polar area to be "a secure and stable region in which US national security interests are safeguarded, the US homeland is defended". It sounds even more pleasant to the ear that it wants the Arctic to be a place where "nations work cooperatively to address shared challenges".

If that is all Washington aspires for in the Arctic, it will find a great partner in Beijing, which has put forward an Arctic policy based on the principles of "respect, cooperation, win-win outcomes, and sustainability". Nations working cooperatively to address shared challenges sounds sufficiently similar to Beijing's proposal for countries to work together to build a community with a shared future for humanity.

But that rhetorical "common ground" is too little, too superficial to conceal the fundamental divergence between the Chinese and US Arctic policies.

Unlike Beijing, which sees greater opportunities for international cooperation in the emerging resources and shipping routes the changing conditions in the Arctic region are presenting, Washington sees the area as a new realm for strategic competition among world powers.

And as its strategy document concedes, the US Arctic Strategy is rooted deeply in the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which formally identify China, along with Russia, as strategic rivals, or competitors. And, just like the other two strategies, the US Arctic Strategy is both a work and outcome of fear-mongering.

While it finds no bones to pick with Beijing's stated purposes and operations regarding the polar region, that has not prevented it from building its case against China on the porous foundation of an imagined "China threat".

China's icebreaking vessels and civilian efforts could support a strengthened, future Chinese military presence in the Arctic Ocean. And its limited operational presence there may "potentially" include "deployment of submarines to the region", it alleges.

Like the two previous documents, this one, too, remains speculative when it comes to the threats it perceives. Like elsewhere, it accuses Beijing of "attempting to gain a role in the Arctic in ways that may undermine international rules and norms".

Yet off the pages of its policy documents, in the real world, it is Washington that is the one undermining international rules and norms.

So which is more conducive to peace, stability and international cooperation in the Arctic, Washington's approach of antagonistic wrangling, or Beijing's proposal for joint, all-win, peaceful development?